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1. INTRODUCTION 
The voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM) is frequently used to investigate 
collective action in a public goods 
environment.  Rational choice theory 
predicts that subjects won't contribute to the 
public good account, instead choosing to 
free-ride on the contributions of others 
(Olsen, 1965).  Evidence from experimental 
VCM games finds the converse: subjects 
typically allocate a nonzero amount to the 
public good account, although these 
contributions tend to decay over time.
1
 Prior 
                                                             
1  For surveys of the literature, see Davis & Holt 
(1993), Ledyard (1995), Offerman (1997), Ostrom 
(2000), and Holt (2007).  
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research has identified several determinants 
of contribution levels in the VCM setting, 
including the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) from the group account
2
 and the 
size of endowment,
3
 with an increase in 
either factor generating higher contribution 
levels.  Punishment/sanctioning mechanism
4
 
or the presence of pre-play communication
5
 
have also been found to raise contribution 
levels.  Behavioral explanations for 
deviations from the rational choice 
prediction are commonplace, focused on 
issues including altruism, social norms, 
other regarding preferences, confusion, and 
inequality aversion.    
Despite the broad attention given to the 
VCM framework, limited research has been 
conducted to evaluate the impact of 
endowment effects on subject behavior in 
this setting (notable exceptions focus on 
endowment heterogeneity
6
 and endowment 
                                                             
2For instance, see Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac et 
al. (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988a), Isaac et al. 
(1994), Fisher et al (1995), Dickinson (1998), Laury 
et al. (1999),  Goeree et al. (2002), and Cadigan et al. 
(2011). 
3 For instance, see Rapoport (1988), Van Dijk & 
Grodska (1992), Chan et al. (1999), Clark (2002), 
Cherry et al. (2005), Buckley & Croson (2006), 
Hofmeyr et al. (2007), De Cremer & Van Dijk 
(2009), Muehlbacher & Kirchler (2009), and 
Spraggon & Oxoby (2009). 
4For instance, see Ostrom et al. (1992), Dickinson 
and Isaac (1998), Fehr and Gächter (2000), 
Dickinson (2001), Masclet et al. (2003), Walker & 
Halloran (2004), Egas and Riedl (2005), 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Page et al. (2005), 
Anderson & Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), 
Gurerk et al. (2006), Carpenter (2007), Sefton et al. 
(2007), Ones and Putterman (2007),  
Nikiforakis(2008), Nikiforakis & Normann (2008), 
and Ertan et al. (2009). 
5For instance, see  Dawes et al. (1977), Isaac and 
Walker (1988b), Palfrey & Rosenthal (1991), Ostrom 
et al. (1992), Sally (1995), Wilson & Sell (1997), 
Brosig et al. (2003), Rege & Telle (2004), Bochet et 
al. (2006), and Chaudhuri (2006). 
6 For instance, see Rapoport (1988), Van Dijk & 
Grodska (1992), Chan et al. (1999), Cherry et al. 
(2005), Buckley & Croson (2006), Hofmeyr et al. 
(2007), De Cremer & Van Dijk (2009). 
origin
7
).  Standard laboratory VCM 
experiments parcel out the total endowment 
in fixed intervals, a structure that constrains 
the timing and magnitude of contributions in 
a way that may influence the level of 
collective action that is observed.  In the 
fixed interval framework, contribution 
decisions made in early rounds are 
binding—tokens allocated to the public 
account cannot be taken back and tokens 
allocated to the private account cannot be 
invested in the public account in a later 
period.  Yet in practice, fundraising ventures 
for public goods frequently rely on 
“pledges” that provide potential information 
on other donors’ willingness to contribute 
but that are not binding.  Allocating the 
endowment in fixed intervals also limits the 
ability of conditional cooperators to 
reciprocate others contributions because 
funds contributed to a private account 
(perhaps early in a session while a subject 
waits to see if there is cooperation) are not 
available for future contributions.  Similarly, 
to the extent that early contributions foster 
cooperative play, parceling endowments in 
fixed intervals limits the ability of subjects 
to signal a willingness to cooperate because 
they do not have access to the entire 
endowment. The primary purpose of this 
paper is to examine the impact of different 
endowment distribution schemes on the 
contribution decisions of subjects in a public 
goods game setting.   
We use a total of four treatments—baseline, 
full endowment, carryover and pledge—
described in detail below.  In brief, our 
results suggest that the endowment scheme 
and ability to make non-binding pledges has 
a substantive impact on subject decision 
making.  Relative to the baseline treatment, 
the non-binding rounds of the pledge 
treatment had higher contributions, but when 
                                                             
7For instance, see Clark (2002), Cherry et al. (2005), 
Muehlbacher & Kirchler (2009), Spraggon & Oxoby 
(2009). 
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the decision was binding contributions were 
significantly lower.  In the carryover and full 
endowment treatments, the higher effective 
endowment (relative to the baseline) appears 
to have played a substantive role in the 
evolution of subject contributions to the 
group account.  In the carryover treatment, 
the effective endowment increased as rounds 
progressed, and this served to increase 
contributions to the group account early in 
the experiment.  By contrast, in the full 
endowment treatment the effective 
endowment was decreased in each period by 
the amount contributed to the group account.  
In this treatment, contributions to the group 
account also declined.  The remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows: section two 
details the experimental design and our 
behavioral hypotheses, section 3 outlines our 
procedures and experimental results, and 
section 4 concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND 
PROCEDURE 
In the basic VCM game, subjects in groups 
of size n are endowed with a number of 
tokens that may be allocated to a group 
account or a private account. Each subject’s 
marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the 
group account is lower than that available 
from the private account, but the group 
account return accrues to all members of the 
group irrespective of their contribution 
decisions. For this specification the Nash 
equilibrium prediction has each subject 
allocate zero tokens to the group account, 
producing the common free-riding dilemma 
because the socially efficient outcome has 
each subject allocate all tokens to the group 
account.  The presence of multiple periods 
(i.e. repeated stage games) does not change 
either the Nash prediction or the socially 
efficient contribution scheme.  Our VCM 
framework follows the standard design, with 
the exception of altering some aspects of the 
endowment allocation.  In every treatment, 
subjects were randomly and anonymously 
placed into groups of four subjects.  In each 
of 10 periods the MPCR from the private 
account and the group account were 
constant: subjects received 1 experimental 
dollar (ED) for each token they allocated to 
the private account and ½ ED for each token 
allocated to the group account.  Importantly, 
each member of the group received the ½ 
ED return for each token allocated to the 
group account, irrespective of their 
contribution decision.  At the end of each 
period, subjects were shown a screen that 
displayed their contribution to the group 
account, the total number of tokens allocated 
to the group account, and their period payoff 
in ED.  At the end of the experimental 
session, the EDs were exchanged for real 
dollar compensation at a rate of $0.10 per 1 
ED.  The total endowment (100 tokens) 
remained fixed across all treatments, 
although the distribution scheme varied. 
Despite the alternative distribution schemes 
(described below) the Nash equilibrium 
prediction and socially efficient outcome 
remain the same across treatments.  Each 
subject earns 100 ED at the Nash 
equilibrium and 200 ED using the socially 
optimal contribution scheme.  
2.1. Baseline 
In the baseline treatment, subjects were 
endowed with 10 experimental tokens (  ) 
at the beginning of every period.  The 
effective per-period endowment to a subject 
in period t (    ) of the baseline can be 
expressed as: 
        
In each period, subjects decided 
independently and simultaneously how to 
allocate these tokens between the group 
account (   ) and the private account 
(      ).  At the end of each round, 
subjects were informed of their contribution 
to the group account as well as the total 
contribution to the group account (   
 
   ). 
Per-token-returns from the private account 
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of 1 ED and from the group account of ½ 
ED results in the following per-period-
earnings formula for each subject (expressed 
in ED): 
                 
 
   
 
2.2. Carryover 
In the carryover treatment, subjects also 
received 10 experimental tokens each 
period. Each subject then decided how to 
allocate these tokens between the group 
account and the private account.  
Importantly, any tokens allocated to the 
private account were available for 
reallocation to the group account in all 
subsequent periods.  As a result, the 
effective endowment for a subject in all 
periods beyond period 1 consisted of 10 
tokens as well as all tokens currently 
allocated to the private account.  In this way, 
the precise per-period endowment to 
subjects varied according to past allocation 
decisions, with effective endowment in 
period t expressed as: 
                     
   
   
 
where            
   
     represents the 
sum of contributions to the private account 
in all previous periods.  Note, this formula 
only applies to effective endowment for t > 
1; the first period endowment is 10 tokens.  
While no per-period-earnings formula for 
subjects in this treatment is available since 
tokens allocated to the private account could 
always reallocated to the group account in a 
future period, the per-period earnings 
equation can be reinterpreted as a total 
earnings equation expressed as follows: 
                     
 
   
 
where ^ indicates that the variable represents 
a total (e.g. total profits, total endowment, 
total subject contribution to the group 
account, and total group contribution to the 
group account). 
2.3. Full Endowment 
In the full endowment treatment, subjects 
receive 100 tokens at the beginning of the 
first period, with no further endowment 
distributions.  In each period, subjects 
decided how many tokens to allocate 
between the group account and the private 
account.  As in the carryover treatment, any 
tokens allocated to the private account were 
available for reallocation to the group 
account in every subsequent period.  As a 
result, the effective per-period endowment 
in period t depended on the past allocation 
decisions in periods 1 to t-1.  Accordingly, 
one can express the effective endowment in 
period t as: 
                 
   
   
 
where     is equal to the lump-sum 
endowment in period 1 and        
   
    
represents the sum of contributions to the 
group account by subject i in all preceding 
periods. Again, because of the design of this 
treatment, it is not possible to construct a 
per-period earnings equation.  Instead, refer 
to the total earnings equation derived in the 
carryover treatment. 
2.4. Pledge 
In the pledge treatment, subjects received 
100 tokens in the first period with no further 
endowment distributions.  At the beginning 
of each period, subjects allocated tokens 
between the group account and the private 
account.  Any tokens allocated to the private 
account could be reallocated to the group in 
the following periods.  Additionally, 
subjects were given the option at the end of 
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each period to reallocate tokens from the 
group account to the private account.  Thus, 
the initial contribution to the group account 
by subject i represents a pledge, which can 
later be reneged.  Since subjects could freely 
reallocate tokens between the group account 
and the private account in all rounds, the 
effective endowment of each subject in 
period t can be expressed simply as: 
          
As such, only the allocation after the last 
round mattered in the determination of 
subject earnings, which can be similarly 
defined according to the total earnings 
equation derived earlier. 
2.5. Behavioral hypotheses 
Given the decay in contributions typically 
observed in VCM games, we expect 
endowment distribution schemes which 
provide subjects with the greatest 
opportunity to contribute early in an 
experimental session to have the highest 
contribution levels and, therefore, the 
greatest economic efficiency.  The 
opportunity for contribution consists of two 
aspects: whether subject allocation decisions 
are binding and whether the effective 
endowment to subjects at a given point in 
the game is relatively large or small.  Non-
binding allocations decisions are those 
decisions that don't affect earnings 
outcomes.  Because these decisions provide 
subjects with the chance to learn about the 
game without affecting final earnings, and 
because contributions have been observed to 
decay in prior research (as referenced in the 
introduction), we expect lower contributions 
in treatments where binding decisions occur 
in later rounds of the session.  Non-binding 
allocation decisions may also be used 
strategically in the sense that subjects may 
try to engender cooperation by contributing 
in the non-binding rounds only to free ride 
when the decisions count.  The size of the 
effective endowment also affects subject 
contributions.  In particular, a relatively 
large effective endowment provided early in 
an experimental session may lead to 
increased contributions.  Following this 
behavioral intuition, the baseline, carryover, 
and full endowment treatments should 
produce higher levels of contributions to the 
group account than the pledge treatment.  
While allocations to the public account are 
binding in the baseline, carryover, and full 
endowment treatments in every round, only 
the allocation decision in the final round is 
binding for the pledge treatment. Since 
earlier allocation decisions are not binding, 
subjects are free to learn about the 
intricacies of the treatment or to strategically 
signal cooperative intent without any costs.  
At the tenth period, we expect subjects will 
have learned the individually payoff 
maximizing strategy and will implement it. 
Ultimately, given that overall contributions 
to the group account depend solely on the 
allocation decisions in the final round when 
subjects are likely to contribute little to the 
group account, the pledge treatment should 
lead to the lowest level of efficiency.   
Of the fully-binding treatments, we expect 
the full endowment treatment to produce the 
greatest overall level of contribution and 
economic efficiency.  Unlike the baseline 
and carryover treatments, subjects are 
endowed with the full 100 tokens in the very 
first period, when they are the most 
inexperienced with the game.  Therefore, the 
full endowment distribution scheme 
provides substantial opportunity for subjects 
to over-contribute to the group account, 
especially in the early periods when subjects 
have not experienced others free riding 
behavior and contribution decay. In contrast, 
the opportunity for subjects in the baseline 
and carryover treatments to over-contribute 
to the group account is consistently limited 
by their per-period endowment of 10 tokens.  
In effective endowment terms, the effective 
endowment in the full endowment treatment 
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is greater than the effective endowments in 
either the baseline or the carryover 
treatments, particularly in earlier periods.  
Accordingly, the full endowment treatment 
should produce the highest contribution 
level and efficiency. Finally, the carryover 
treatment has a higher effective endowment 
than the baseline, which should lead to 
higher relative contributions and efficiency.  
In the carryover treatment, allocations to the 
private account in previous periods can be 
used for the group account in future periods, 
thereby increasing the effective endowment 
to subjects in every period following the 
first period.  Thus, the effective endowment 
in each period of the carryover treatment is 
greater than or equal to that of the baseline, 
even though the total endowment remains 
fixed across treatment.  As a result, we 
expect subject contribution to the group 
account to be higher in the carryover 
treatment than in the baseline.   
In sum, considering whether allocations 
decisions are binding as well as the size of 
effective endowments, our behavioral 
expectations are as follows: the full 
endowment treatment generates the greatest 
contributions to the group account, the 
pledge treatment produces the lowest level, 
and the carryover treatment leads to a 
greater level of overall contributions than 
the baseline.   
3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
AND RESULTS  
3.1 Procedures 
Subjects for the experiment were recruited 
by email from the student body at 
Gettysburg College.  A total of one hundred 
and thirty-six subjects participated in nine 
sessions across four treatments.  Sessions 
were conducted in the Gettysburg Lab for 
Experimental Economics and used the Z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Instructions for the experiment are provided 
in Appendix A.  Upon conclusion of the 
experimental session, subjects were 
individually called to receive compensation 
privately.  Experimental sessions typically 
lasted 45 minutes, including time spent 
reading instructions.  Participant compensa-
tion ranged from $5.85-$21.75, with an 
average compensation of $14.98.  The 
number of subjects per treatment and the 
average compensation per treatment can be 
found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
Treatment Number of subjects Average compensation 
Baseline 28 $14.83 
Carryover 40 $15.89 
Full Endowment 36 $15.26 
Pledge 32 $13.64 
  
3.2 Total Contributions 
Our analysis of the experimental results 
begins with total contribution percentages 
by treatment.  In each treatment, subjects 
were endowed with a total of 100 tokens.  
We define the total contribution as the 
number of the 100 token endowment 
contributed to the public account over the 
course of the experiment.  With the 
exception of the pledge treatment, the total 
contribution is the sum of contributions 
across the 10 periods.  Because 
contributions were not binding in periods 1-
9 for the Pledge treatment, we use the total 
contribution to the group account as 
determined after period 10.  For each 
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treatment, Figure 1 presents a cumulative 
frequency distribution with the percentage 
of subjects on the vertical axis and total 
contributions to the group account as a 
percentage on the horizontal axis.   
 
The pledge treatment possesses the largest 
percentage of subjects to contribute zero 
tokens to the group account (exactly 25%).  
Furthermore, with approximately 60% of 
subjects contributing less than 25% of 
endowment, the pledge treatment produced 
the results closest to the Nash equilibrium 
prediction.  Note also that the cumulative 
distributions for the carryover and full 
endowment treatments indicate greater 
contributions, with roughly 80% of subjects 
contributing 90% or less of total endowment 
for both treatments.  In contrast, the pledge 
and baseline treatments had 80% of subjects 
contributing 75% and 65% or less of the 
total endowment, respectively. The 
carryover treatment in particular appears to 
have had higher contributions as evidenced 
by its consistent position furthest to the right 
side of the chart. Interestingly, the effect of 
the carryover and full endowment treatments 
appears most prevalent on the upper 50% of 
the total contribution distribution, at which 
point both actual frequencies diverge 
substantially from the baseline treatment.  
To test whether differences across 
treatments are statistically significant, we 
utilize a Wilcoxon rank-sum test on total 
contributions.  The results are shown in 
Table 2.   
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Table 2. Treatment Contribution 
Comparisons (Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
Test) 
Treatment Combination Prob > |z| 
Baseline/Carryover 0.16 
Baseline/Full 0.56 
Baseline/Pledge 0.10 
Carryover/Full 0.44 
Carryover/Pledge 0.01 
Full/Pledge 0.07 
 
Consistent with our expectations, 
differences between the pledge and other 
treatments are significant at the 10% level or 
better.  While the carryover treatment had 
the highest total contributions, differences 
between the carryover and baseline 
treatment are at best marginally significant. 
Overall, both the ordering of the actual 
distributions and the statistical results are 
consistent with the behavioral predictions: 
contributions increased in the baseline 
treatment relative to the pledge treatment as 
well as in the full endowment and carryover 
treatments relative to the baseline treatment, 
although the magnitude of the increase was 
not always sufficient to be deemed 
statistically significant.   
 In addition to predicting that the 
different treatments would affect total 
contributions differently, the behavioral 
hypotheses developed earlier also predicted 
that each treatment would uniquely affect 
economic efficiency.  Define a total 
efficiency index for treatment s with n 
subjects indexed by i as: 
             
                        
 
   
 
  
The efficiency calculations for each 
treatment are provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Efficiency Results 
Treatment Efficiency 
Baseline 48.32% 
Carryover 58.85% 
Full Endowment 52.64% 
Pledge 36.44% 
 
This efficiency index characterizes the 
average level of total contribution for each 
treatment.  In this way, the Nash equilibrium 
of zero contributions to the group account 
corresponds to an efficiency of 0% while the 
socially efficient equilibrium of contribute 
all corresponds to an efficiency of 100%.   
3.3 Per-Period Contributions 
In addition to the analysis of aggregate 
contributions provided above, we are 
interested in the distribution of contributions 
by period.  Our endowment schemes provide 
a wide range of potential contributions, and 
as such we investigate both the level of 
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contributions and the percent of the effective 
endowment contributed.  Figure 2 depicts 
the average per-period contribution (in 
level) to the group account across treatment 
and period. The pledge treatment is 
excluded from the figure because of 
substantial volatility in per-period, absolute 
contributions, a consequence of the non-
binding nature of allocation decisions that 
obfuscates any meaningful comparison 
between the pledge treatment and the other 
treatments on a round-by-round basis. 
    
 
Contributions in the baseline treatment are 
consistent with those observed in the 
literature for VCM experiments using 
similarly sized groups and MPCR levels, 
and show decay from around 50% of the 
endowment in early rounds to about around 
30% in the final period.  While the level of 
contributions also fell in the full endowment 
treatment, contributions in the carryover 
treatment remained fairly constant, moving 
between 5 and 7 tokens per period.  It is 
important to keep in mind that while the 
level of contributions was relatively 
constant, the effective endowment was 
increasing.  For example, a subject 
contributing 5 tokens in the first period (out 
of the 10 token endowment) would see their 
second period endowment increase to 15. A 
second period contribution of 5 would then 
lead to a third period endowment of 20.  It 
may be that the increase in endowment 
served as a focal point for subjects, 
preventing the decay typically observed in 
public goods experiments.  Note also that 
the level of contributions was decreasing for 
the full endowment treatment.  In this case 
the effective endowment was falling in 
every period by the amount contributed to 
the group account.  As was the case for the 
carryover treatment, this may have served as 
a focal point—as the endowment decreased, 
subjects reduced contributions to the group 
account.     
Figure 3 displays the average, relative 
contribution to the group account across 
treatment and period.  Relative contribution 
(      ) for subject i in period t of treatment s 
is defined as:  
       
      
      
 
where        represents the contribution to the 
group account and        represents the 
effective endowment, calculated for each 
treatment previously. 
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As a percentage of the effective endowment, 
contributions to the group account decayed 
in the baseline, carryover, and pledge 
treatments.  Importantly, the decay in 
contributions for the pledge did not occur 
until the final period—at which point the 
contribution was binding and very close to 
the final relative contribution from the 
baseline.  As shown earlier, the efficiency of 
the pledge treatment was low relative to that 
in the baseline. While subject contributions 
to the group account were binding in the 
baseline, they appear to have been used 
strategically in the pledge, with subjects 
increasing their relative contributions right 
up to the point that it mattered.  Thus, the 
binding nature of early contributions in the 
baseline led to higher aggregate 
contributions and efficiency.   
With respect to the full endowment and 
carryover treatments, relative contributions 
were consistently lower than the baseline 
treatment.  While the level of contributions 
in those treatments was higher, so was the 
effective endowment.  For the full 
endowment treatment, starting with the 
entire 100 token endowment made the 
relative contribution low—it remained 
around 10% throughout the experiment.  As 
previously described, the effective 
endowment in the carryover treatment was 
increasing as the experiment progressed and 
tokens allocated to the private account were 
made available for future use.  This, even 
though the level of contributions was 
basically flat, the relative contribution was 
decreasing.   
In order to confirm the aggregate 
interpretation of relative, per-period 
contributions, a model of individual per-
period, decision-making is now developed.  
Using random effects regression estimates, 
the following contribution model is 
estimated: 
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where      is the relative contribution to the 
group account by subject i in period t,    is 
a vector of dummies controlling for 
treatment (baseline is omitted condition),    
is a vector for period,     is a vector of 
interaction terms between period and 
treatment,        is a vector of lagged 
controls for past subject behavior,   is a 
dummy variable for the last period (all other 
periods are omitted condition),   is an 
interaction term between the pledge 
treatment and the final period dummy 
variable, and      is the stochastic, 
contemporaneous error term.  To elaborate, 
       is a vector that consists of subject i's 
relative contribution to the group account in 
the previous period (      ) and subject i's 
deviation from the average, relative 
contribution of her group in the previous 
period (               ).  All control 
variables follow from prior research.
8
 The 
regression results are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Random Effects Regression Results* 
Independent Variable 
Coefficient Estimate 
(two-tailed p-values) 
Carryover 
-0.0717749 
(0.077) 
FullEndowment 
-0.1147246 
(0.001)    
Pledge 
 0.015186 
(0.743)    
Period 
-0.0101347 
(0.046)    
Period*Carryover 
 0.0075213 
(0.226)    
Period*FullEndowment 
 0.0150233 
(0.019)    
Period*Pledge 
0.0086663 
(0.248)    
LastPeriod 
-0.0319348 
(0.188) 
LastPeriod*Pledge 
-0.1736916 
(0.003) 
RelContLagged 
 0.8852845 
(0.000)    
RelContLaggedDeviate 
-0.1721071 
(0.000)    
Constant 
.106315 
(0.003)    
 
R
2
 overall 0.6995                                       
Wald χ2 2821.65 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 
N 1224 
*Robust standard errors 
 
8
 In particular, see Dickinson (1998), Galbiati & Vertova (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), and Cadigan et al. (2011). 
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The coefficient estimates on the full 
endowment treatment variable, the period 
variable, the interaction term between these 
two variables, the lagged contribution 
variable, the interaction term between 
pledge and the last period, and the lagged 
contribution deviate variable are all 
statistically significant at the 0.05 
significance level.  Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimates on these variables are 
in the correct direction.  Of the treatment 
dummies, only the full endowment variable 
coefficient estimate was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 significance level, 
although the carryover estimate was very 
close to being as well.  The negative signs of 
the coefficient estimates on the carryover 
and treatment variables support the previous 
interpretation of the per-period, relative 
contributions trends.  Also, the coefficient 
estimate on the full endowment dummy is 
the third most substantial, revealing the 
importance of the full endowment treatment 
in the per-period relative contribution 
decision of individuals. The coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term between 
period and full endowment indicates that 
relative contributions in the full endowment 
treatment increased each period, relative to 
the baseline.  These results lend credence to 
the upward sloping trend of relative 
contributions in the full endowment 
treatment observed earlier.  The entire effect 
of the full endowment treatment on relative 
contribution is characterized by the joint 
effect of its dummy variable and its 
interaction term, itself a function of period.  
This interpretation applies to all treatment 
variables. 
The statistical significance and sign of the 
coefficient estimate on period reveals that 
subjects' relative contribution to the group 
account exhibited decay over time, an 
observation consistently substantiated.  
These results suggest that subject behavior 
does converge toward the Nash equilibrium 
outcome where all subjects contribute 0 
tokens to the group account in all periods.  
Notably, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between the pledge 
treatment dummy variable and the dummy 
variable for the last period is statistically 
significant in difference from zero at the 
0.05 significance level.  The sign of this 
estimate supports the existence of a sharp 
and distinct decline in subject contributions 
in the final period of the pledge treatment, as 
documented earlier, a result of subjects 
learning to free-ride.  This sharp decay is 
also suggestive of subjects learning how to 
free-ride most effectively; subjects appear to 
actively attempt to deceive other players into 
over-contributing to the group account.  
Rising relative contributions in non-binding 
rounds represents subjects signaling their 
willingness to contribute to the group 
account to their group members.  However, 
relative contributions decline sharply in the 
final round, contrary to signaling in prior 
rounds, as subjects renege on their initial 
pledges.  This behavior is entirely consistent 
with the strategic framework of Nash 
equilibrium in which subjects free-ride on 
the contributions of others, although it does 
also suggest that subjects actively attempt to 
encourage other members to over-contribute 
in addition to simply contributing zero 
tokens to the group account. Notably, 
however, all contributions do not collapse to 
zero in the final round of the pledge 
treatment, indicating that some subjects 
maintain a willingness to cooperate and 
contribute despite being given ample 
opportunity to learn the incentive to free ride 
on others’ contributions. 
Lagged relative contribution to the group 
account (       ) influenced subject's 
contribution decision significantly.  
Intuitively, one would expect that a subject 
that had contributed a large amount to the 
group account in the previous period would 
also contribute a lot to the group account in 
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the current period.  This relationship is 
borne out with a coefficient estimate of 
approximately 0.8853, easily the most 
substantial factor in the contribution 
decision.  Similarly, lagged relative 
contribution deviation (               ) 
factored both substantially, and 
significantly, into the contribution decision.  
With a coefficient estimate of roughly -
0.1721, the intuition behind this estimate is 
clear: if a subject contributed more to the 
group account relative to the rest of the 
group, she would respond by contributing 
less in the subsequent period.  Similarly, if a 
subject contributed less to the group account 
relative to the rest of the group, she would 
respond by contributing more in the 
following period.   
4. Concluding Remarks 
Our research evaluates the impact of 
different endowment schemes on subject 
decision making in a standard VCM 
framework.  Our treatments varied whether 
a subject’s decision was binding and the 
effective endowment available to subjects.  
The treatments that had binding allocation 
decisions and high effective endowment 
were predicted to generate the greatest 
overall levels of contribution.  Evidence 
from the lab supported these basic 
behavioral predictions.  Most notably, the 
pledge treatment possessed the lowest level 
of overall contribution, followed by the 
baseline treatment and the full endowment, 
respectively, with the carryover treatment 
possessing the highest level of contribution.  
Only the latter result (i.e. the carryover 
treatment achieving greater contribution 
than full endowment treatment) was 
unexpected.  This result may be linked to the 
impact of increasing effective endowments 
for the carryover and decreasing effective 
endowments for the full endowment.  
Testing differences between the frequency 
distributions of total contribution for each 
treatment provided further support of the 
behavioral hypotheses.   
In addition to analyzing overall outcomes, 
per-period, absolute and relative 
contribution trends for each treatment were 
analyzed.  These results were largely 
complementary to the primary, aggregate 
analysis.  With respect to absolute 
contributions, the carryover treatment and 
full endowment treatment had the largest 
absolute contribution levels while the 
baseline treatment consistently had the 
lowest.  Concerning relative contributions, 
the pledge and the baseline treatments 
possessed the largest relative contributions, 
while the carryover and full endowment 
treatments had the lowest.  Given that 
relative contribution was a function of 
absolute contribution and effective 
endowment, these results suggested that 
absolute contributions rose less than one-
for-one with increases in effective 
endowment in the full endowment and 
carryover treatments.   
Finally, to reinforce the nonparametric 
analysis, an individual model of relative 
contribution decision-making was 
developed.  The coefficient estimates were 
consistent with previous literature as well as 
all analyses herein.  For instance, the 
coefficient estimate on period was 
statistically significant and negative, 
indicating decay, while the coefficient 
estimates on lagged relative contribution and 
lagged relative deviation were positive and 
negative, respectively, as well statistically 
significant.  Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimates on the full endowment and 
carryover treatment dummies were both 
negative and either statistically significant or 
very close to being so, results that agreed 
with the nonparametric analyses 
summarized above. Future research could 
investigate the carryover and full 
endowment treatments in greater depth.  In 
contrast to the behavioral predictions, the 
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carryover treatment generated greater total 
contributions and greater economic 
efficiency than the full endowment 
treatment, although these differences were 
not statistically significant.  A rationale for 
this discrepancy may provide insight into the 
endowment distribution schemes most 
capable of achieving greater total 
contributions and economic efficiency.  
Additionally, the notion that economic 
efficiency and total contributions may be 
maximized by imposing mechanisms that 
take advantage of subject unfamiliarity is 
worth further consideration. 
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APPENDIX 
Instructions (Baseline)
9
 
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions you might earn a fair amount of money that will be paid to you privately and in cash at 
the end of today's session. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other 
participants make. You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions 
private do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
The Experiment 
For this experiment you will be placed in a group of four people (you plus three other people). We have 
already randomly assigned you to a group. You will remain in this group for the duration of the 
experiment. However, you will not be told each other’s identities. Your earnings will depend upon the 
decisions that you make and the decisions that the other people in your group make. 
The experiment will consist of ten rounds.   
At the beginning of round one, each person in the group will be endowed with 10 tokens.  You must choose 
how many of these tokens to keep in your private account and how many tokens to allocate to a group 
account. The amount of money that you earn in each decision round depends on how many tokens you have in 
your private account, how many tokens you allocate to the group account, and how many tokens the others in 
your group allocate to the group account. 
You will earn 10 cents for each token you have in your private account. Your will earn 5 cents for each token 
you have allocated to the group account, plus 5 cents from each token allocated to the group account by the 
other persons in your group.  
To summarize, in each round you will earn: 
$0.10 times the number of tokens you have in your private account + 
$0.05 times the total number of tokens allocated to the group account by your group 
After you have made your decision for the round, please wait while the others in your group finish making 
their decisions.  At the end of each round, there will be a summary screen that allows you to see how many 
tokens were allocated to the group account, as well as your personal earnings. You will not be able to see 
which individuals allocated tokens to the group account, or how much a specific individual allocated. 
The same process will be repeated for all ten rounds. At the conclusion of all ten rounds, each participant’s 
earnings will be totaled and shown privately.   
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. Otherwise, please press the "Continue" button at 
the bottom right of your screen. 
 
9Instructions for other treatments available upon request. 
